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Ridley Scott has recently told us that Decker, from Blade Runner, is in fact a replicant. 
There are several reasons why I think this a disservice to fans of the film. My primary 
concern is that it substantiates takings of it that focus primarily on the characters at 
the expense of, as a cover for, explorations of our own responses to Scott’s ominous 
city-world and its subjected denizens. The choice to create a city-world so 
reminiscent of our own today was certainly not an arbitrary one. We have been 
offered a cold simulacrum—a replication—of our own cities, designed, surely, to bring 
to conscious awareness likely feelings of ambivalence many of us have towards them. 
I believe the reason we are interested in Decker (a response so natural to us that the 
camera’s interest in him mimics our own: it becomes our own viewing eye) is that his 
movement, his explorations, seem like they might tend to our ambivalence. This is 
why we follow him, and why we pay close attention to what he (also Gaff—but 
Decker in particular) attends to. This search for our own identity, for a right way of 
being in this simulacrum of our own city-world, is well captured in this sequence 
through camera placement, camera movement (or lack there-of), and the mise-en-
scene. 
Certainly not all sequences in the film are well suited for self-reflection—there 
are ample sequences that are either tense (and thus encourage us to self-protect rather 
than explore) or exciting (where we mimic the mindset of the chaser or the chased)—
but this one actually is. The opening shot helps us feel composed and relaxed—
tranquil. Camera placement, lack of camera movement, and the particular nature of 
the mise-en-scene in this shot produce this effect. We are offered a level, extreme 
long-view shot of the environs, where we float above most of the city. The scene is 
near picturesque, with its mostly still field of black space, wherein we encounter a 
protagonist to key in on at a quieting remove from all other objects. The movement 
in the mise-en-scene is the predictable, slow, curving of the flying car as it moves 
away from us. Knowing the camera eye not fixed to the potentially unnerving 
proximity of the close-up, and knowing the action to be something we pursue (i.e., we 
are closing in on the car), the next shot—a following shot with low-angle framing, 
situated at a building across the street, several levels above street level but much 
closer to it than we were to the car—seems guided by our own interest. The probing, 
inquisitive camera “eye” has become, for all intents and purposes, our own, and will 
remain so through the rest of the sequence. 
After the second shot, where we look down on Decker and Gaff via high-angle 
framing, we cut to a shot where our interest is drawn upwards, via a low-angle 
framing shot, to a sign flashing YUKON on top of the building nearest them. It is 
almost as if we are presenting ourselves with a choice, the same choice we had in the 
first shot of the sequence: Should we direct our interest to the flashing neon-sign and 
the message it cannot help but present us with, or do we continue to attend to 
Decker and Gaff? The camera looks back to Decker and Gaff (switches to the 
previous high-angle frame), and follows its present course—anticipating their 
destination, it reappears in the replicant’s apartment—and here it surely reflects our 
own decision when confronted with a choice away from a giant flashing Coca-Cola 
sign that announces DRINK(!) while referring but to a simple beverage, and a 
YUKON sign so bespeaking of the artificial we have to fight to keep our known 
sense of the Yukon unadulterated upon sight of it. Surely what will interest us most 
will be something we must search for and find, not something openly presented to us 
within the city’s invasive skin. 
With the next shot we are inside the replicant’s apartment, looking at Decker and 
Gaff from the apartment’s perimeter. We know the bright neon lights we briefly 
attended to failed to present us with “answers”—mightn’t Decker or Gaff come 
upon something more satisfying? We focus on the two, via a long shot that lasts until 
both Decker and Gaff have entered the apartment, as if considering for a brief 
moment our preferred candidate. We choose Decker, who in his movement across 
the room mimics the familiar, accustomed movement of the car in the opening shot. 
Obvious choice, really, for Gaff presents us, with his city-immigrant racial flavor and 
his Old South, bow-tied, country-gentleman attire, the same feeling of uncertainty, of 
incongruence—like we are all subjects to be played with—we felt upon sight of the 
YUKON sign. Moreover, Gaff in his stillness, with his dandyish attire and muted 
expressions, seems imperturbable, quite ready to mock anyone’s inconveniently 
experienced emotions—including, we intuit, our own, if they should ever somehow 
come into play. Though we will cut back to him while Decker is in the bathroom, 
Gaff, no doubt, is our second choice. 
We do not exactly follow Decker—that is, we do not trail behind him, looking 
over his shoulder. Instead, seeing in the previous shot that he was heading into a 
chamber (a bathroom), anticipating his destination, we cut to a shot where we are 
inside the chamber, looking at him from the same vantage point we assumed in the 
previous shot. However, we will follow him, the camera will come to situate itself just 
over his shoulder, as he spots and finds something that captures his interest. The 
movement reflects our eagerness: What has he found? Is it fit for our consideration, 
too? We, the camera, now cut to an extreme close-up of his hand cusping a scale he 
has placed in a small plastic bag. The scale, in conjunction with the hand that holds it, 
are key components of the mise-en-scene: one of three groupings we will be 
presented with in this sequence through the explorations (with Decker) or 
manipulations (by Gaff) of two people who, through their actions and their interests, 
are showing us how they themselves exist within this world. This is our own keenest 
interest—how to involve ourselves in this world?, what to make of this world?; and we 
show this in our switch to extreme close-ups when we spot objects like the scale that 
may afford more self-understanding than could possibly come from commandant 
neon signs. 
The scale, though, in the same way as the Blade Runner city-world is and is not a 
city of our own experience, is and is not “us,” is a jostling reaquaintance with part of 
our own selves. Though neither we nor Decker have scales, bathrooms, via the tub, 
sink, or toilet, have traces of our body surface that are as disturbing to our sense of 
what it means to be human as are the skins of our cities, and involve us in 
uncomfortable self-questioning. Is the body just enfleshment? Mightn’t it be (or 
somehow come to be) beyond simply necessary, itself possess, rather than just carry, 
essence, anima—soul? This a consideration we are more likely to make in regards to 
humans than with replicants, not because they are obviously all function down to 
their densely wired core, but because our souls have winnowed to the point where the 
most banal, brutal, dispensable—dead—aspects of our bodies seem to occasion the 
truest account of who we now are. 
Troubling… so we switch to Gaff, who, for a moment at least, actually seems the 
more appealing of the pair. We cut to an extreme close-up of his hand putting down 
something he was making—an origami stickman—on a table. Momentarily, this feels 
reassuring. He is not finding anything; rather, he is exerting himself, making a 
comment on, we think, the current behavior of Decker. Gaff, through this simple, 
confident action, provides visual evidence that one can avoid being self-implicated, 
adversely affected by one’s actions, if one places oneself along the perimeter, making 
comments about someone more directly involved and exposed. Gaff might be 
making an honest appraisal of Decker, but not one likely shorn of irony or 
irreverence (we notice the stickman’s erection). This brings to mind a dissonance-
incurring question: If like Gaff we are mostly uninvolved, for the most part 
extragenous to a world we count ourselves still part of, to what extent can we fairly 
be said to be living our lives—to what extent, even, are we alive? Unlike us, Gaff has a 
hand, and what a hand represents—an embodied existence in the film world. But 
through the action of his hand we understand he really exists more like a removed, 
disembodied eye—that is, like us—than one enfleshed. Thus reminded of a way of 
being similar to our own which was unsubstantial, unsatisfying enough to motivate 
our search for a more satisfying way of being in the first place, we choose to once 
again follow Decker, hoping he might find us something just as interesting but more 
satisfying to contemplate. 
We are not disappointed. Decker’s subsequent exploration leads to an object 
which, though it will likely bring to Decker’s mind questions pertaining to his own 
identity (notably, is he a replicant?), suggests for us and potentially for him a way of 
being through a choice of what and what not to value which makes these questions, if 
not moot, potentially nowhere near as vital for our self-understanding. Decker does 
not fear being a replicant because this would make him one of the hunted; he fears it 
because it makes his experiences, his own treasured memories, an implantation from 
some disinterested other person—because it would make him more someone else’s 
personal agenda than himself a person ensouled. But what cannot be an implantation 
is his experience of the here and now, and his choice whether to make for himself the 
kind of experiences worthy of photos is under his control, subject, only, to his 
decision on how to relate to the people he meets, objects he finds, the environments 
he finds himself within. 
The third prop we will focus on, then, are the replicant’s photos, hidden under 
several layers of shirts and sweaters. Unlike with the tub, wherein Decker found 
evidence in minuscule form but bared to view, the photos are not found in the empty 
first drawer we focus on: they are instead concealed in the second drawer. Scott, in 
choosing to place this prop under shirts and sweaters, offers us an encounter with a 
replicant’s home life which actually suggests a human(e), warm persona. The replicant 
is protecting, insulating, his photos, keeping them at a distance from casual 
observance—what you are supposed to do with intimate treasures. But this isn’t all he 
is up to. Here is someone who is not so sensitized to and determined by the 
threatening environment so to feel the need to take it into consideration in his every 
judgment. The placement is appropriate for someone who values an object enough to 
hide it. But by hiding it in a dresser under shirts and sweaters—a place so suggestive 
of human warmth and closeness—he is in fact revealing much about himself. The 
nature of their placement amounts to him telling himself, telling anyone who happens 
upon them: “The experiences these photos embody matter to me; they are the very 
core of my being. Therefore to be placed in the most homey compartment of my 
living quarters.” (Shortly following this sequence we will hear Batty teasingly ask 
Leon, “Did you get your precious photos?”: Leon had obviously been harping on the 
importance of retrieving them.) 
In a cold, threatening world this kind of ostensibly trivial, what we would 
normally think of as generic self-exposure, proves astonishing. In the close-up of 
Decker leafing through the photos (where we see, and Decker will focus on, a house 
interior we later recognize in Rachael’s treasured photos), we have moved from a 
state of safe remove (in the initial long shot) to situating ourselves in near proximity 
to precious vulnerability. But unlike with the scales, whose discovery is threatening to 
us because they involve us in an act of self-definition which makes us seem more 
denatured and cold than human, the photos are threatening because they are 
disorienting, way out of place. They are evidence that we truly can, whether the 
memories they are supposed to represent are real or not, value the intimate human 
world they represent. To know that someone thinks like this, could value being open 
and vulnerable over sure protection, is itself a source of strength. It presents an 
option, a way of being, so ludicrous to not be possible yet so wonderfully is! Within a 
drawer of folded clothes, within an apartment, within a building, within a city of 
endless numbers of buildings, we have found something powerful enough to suggest 
an eventual unfolding of a macrocosm of a different kind: a humane world of 
intimate proximity and touch, that could well matter to us, and that may just be 
within reach. 
This is a find well worthy of our search. It is a critical placement in the mise-en-
scene of a prop so significant we replicate the actions of the replicant and protect our 
experience, secure it for future consideration. Thus, as would be the natural reaction 
to a discovery of something so surprisingly, so suggestive of warmth in a world where 
we possibly accepted it as something on every wall advertised but nowhere really to 
be found, we cut to a shot where we are no longer in the apartment. We cut to a shot 
similar enough to the opening shot of the sequence to suggest—like Decker’s 
exploration of the drawers—an opening and sealing-off of a discovery. The camera is 
still; we have a view of the city-environment; and there is a vehicle moving in the 
frame. However, this time, not tranquil, the scene is instead very tense: We find 
ourselves in the path of a police vehicle advancing ever larger, ever larger, ever larger 
towards us! 
Perhaps surprisingly, this last shot also feels as if in response to our own will. We 
use our freedom of movement to place ourselves in view of the most threatening 
image we could imagine and know to provide a good sense of what it can feel like to 
exist in this city. Unlike in the first shot, we choose to be grounded at street level, and 
engage in a long-shot of the environment rather than an extreme long-shot. After 
asking ourselves, “Can we explore our human need for a warm community, or will 
this make us feel all too intolerably vulnerable to the dangers in this world?,” we cut 
to a danger, and see. We ask ourselves, before this menacing encounter, “Will we 
learn that faith in privacy and self, home, family and friends, is a source of strength to 
resist the most fear-inspiring experiences we might encounter in this world?” 
These are questions that are not settled or answered for us (or for Decker) at 
film’s end. They are questions that should not ever be quietened by us lest we ignore 
their importance and relevance in our own post 9 /11 world. We have seen and 
explored how Decker, Gaff, and the replicants exist in their world, and imagined how 
we might too: Now how do we choose to exist in our own world? What assumptions 
do we make of its nature? Is our world an inevitably hostile one of hunters and 
hunted? Or is it something that can be re-made, and thus, potentially, peaceful and 
humane? What are the consequences of this decision for our own behavior? Do we 
arm ourselves and hunt, though this means encountering life with the mind-forg’d 
manacles of polarized thinking? Do we protect ourselves and avoid whatever could 
make us feel vulnerable, though it would surely also mean narrowing our life 
experience? Or do we involve ourselves as warm-hearted neighbors, and help rather 
than hunt, reach out rather than isolate, even if this puts us in harm’s way? These are 
explorations we involve ourselves with in our encounter with Scott’s creation, and 
should continue doing long afterwards. 
Ridley Scott makes a mistake in telling us that Decker is a replicant because he 
thereby privileges the certainty of conclusions over the uncertainty in loose inquiry. 
In a sense, he is mimicking the too knowing Gaff, not inquisitive Decker. Yet Blade 
Runner surely represents the creation of a questing and questioning soul, born of an 
impulse to reject the kind of closure urged on us by impossible-to-ignore neon signs, 
in favor of a more open project. Reflected in, and produced by, its choice of camera 
placement and movement, and in its offering, through close-ups, of three key props 
for our consideration, the film involves us in a search which presents us with choices, 
not necessarily with answers. Blade Runner really is an existential film; its glory is its 
uncertainty. Scott rightly eliminated the rosy ending of the initial release from his 
editor’s cut. He should have remained mute as to whether or not Decker is a 
replicant.   
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